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Abstract—In this paper we describe a holistic approach for
Fault-Tolerant Network-on-Chip (NoC) based many-core systems
that incorporates a System Health Monitoring Unit (SHMU)
which collects all the fault information from the system, classifies
them and provides different solutions for different fault classes.
A Mapper/Scheduler Unit (MSU) is used for online generation of
different mapping and scheduling solutions based on the current
fault configuration of the system. For detection of faults, we have
leveraged concurrent online checkers, able to capture faults with
low detection latency and providing the fault information for
SHMU, which can be later used for the recovery process. The
experimentation setup is performed in an open source tool, able
to perform the mapping, scheduling and simulation of the system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the integration density of the cores on a single chip
increases, it can cause many-core Network-on-Chip (NoC)
based systems to be more susceptible to different sources of
faults, such as Electro-Migration (EM), wear-out, etc, thus
affecting their dependability. Even if all the manufacturing
defects are captured during initial testing, faults that occur
during the lifetime of the device are inevitable. Therefore,
there is a necessity to address faults during the lifetime of
the system. The growing size of Dark-Silicon on the chip,
provides us with the advantage of having redundant units on
the chip which can be exploited for mitigation of such faults.
In this paper, we introduce an architecture for fault-tolerance
and fault management in many-core NoC based systems.
The proposed approach, equips the system with different
components for detection, classification and recovering from
faults. This is performed both at hardware level and system
and application level. To this end, the system is equipped
with a System Health Monitoring Unit (SHMU) which keeps a
holistic view of the system’s health status in a System Health
Map (SHM) memory. SHMU collects the fault information
via iJTAG [1] mechanism from the system components. In
order to detect faults, each router in the NoC is augmented
with a fault detection mechanism implemented as concurrent
online checkers [2]. This would provide a holistic view of the
system’s health status to SHMU in order to take further actions
at system and application level.
In order to take care of faults at the system and application
level, SHMU utilises a Mapper/Scheduler Unit (MSU) in
the system, which is in charge of mapping and scheduling
application tasks onto the Processing Elements (PEs). SHMU
communicates with MSU via a shared memory to pass the
current state of the system to be used by mapping heuristics.
For instance, if a permanent fault occurs on one of the PEs,
it would make it possible to perform re-mapping and/or re-
scheduling of the tasks, based on different heuristics imple-
mented in MSU. In addition, in order to avoid packets with
unreachable destinations being injected into the network and
thus wandering in the system and causing conditions such as
congestion or never reaching their destinations, the system uses
NoCDepend [3] mechanism which keeps compact information
(in form of rectangle regions) about the non-reachable areas
of the NoC in each router’s output, providing routers with a
holistic view of such non-reachable areas. In this case if the
destination is not accessible from any of the router’s outputs,
the packet would be dropped instantly, preventing all further
hazards in the system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
II, the state-of-the-art literature is discussed. Section III is
dedicated to describing the overall system architecture and
sections IV to VI focus on each component separately. In
Section VII, description of the experimentation setup using a
developed open source tool is provided. Finally, Section VIII
concludes the paper, along with discussions about future plans.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, the state-of-the-art research which address
faults during the lifetime of a NoC-based many-core system
is reviewed. Different works have addressed faults and fault-
tolerance in NoCs from a specific point of view, each one
considering a different fault model. From one main perspec-
tive, the current works in the literature can be categorized as
architecture-level and system-level approaches in dealing with
faults. Indeed, other classification criteria are also addressed in
different works, such as classifying faults by their occurrence
frequency to transient, intermittent or permanent. In terms of
level of granularity, different works have addressed faults on
communication links, on-chip routers and turns and on-chip
cores (Processing Elements) or a combination of them.
In general, architecture-level approaches usually impose
additional area overhead in order to tolerate faults, whereas
system-level and application-level approaches tackle the issue
by delegating the task more to the software side, such as re-
mapping applications onto the network or applying redundancy
schemes in software. Usually, system-level approaches incur
negligible area overhead to the system, which makes them a
better option. In the following, some of the architecture-level
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and system- and application-level approaches for handling
faults in Network-on-Chips are reviewed.
A. Architecture-level approaches
Architecture-level approaches address faults by augmenting
the network with additional components. For instance in [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] fault-tolerant network topologies
and redundant components (such as spare cores or routers)
are introduced in order to achieve fault-tolerance. [11] has
applied redundancy to links in order to tolerate link failures.
Tosun et al. have introduced a fault-tolerant irregular topology
generation method for application-specific Network-on-Chips
[4], pursuing two main goals: (1) generating a fault-tolerant
topology that would be able to maintain communication be-
tween tasks of an application despite of some link failures
in the network and (2) proposing a Simulated Annealing
(SA) based mapping algorithm for minimizing total energy
consumption as the cost function. The scope of [4] is focusing
maily on link failures, therefore, faults in Processing Elements
(PEs) and router turns are not addressed. Moreover, single link
failure is considered, although it is mentioned that multiple
links errors can also be tolerated as long as the failure of
multiple links does not disconnect the network.
In [10], a fault-tolerant reconfigurable NoC architecture is
proposed which addresses fault tolerance by router redundancy.
To be more specific, each Processing Element (PE) is con-
nected to two routers. The proposed approach works based on
the concept of hardware redundancy with spares, thus in each
redundant router group, if one gets faulty, the spare one takes
the role of the faulty one, thus guaranteeing that the network
continues its normal operation. However, two drawbacks of
this work would be that (1) considering spare router for each
Processing Element (PE) in the network can impose significant
area overhead, specially that the spare one is not used during
the normal functioning of the network, and (2) in this work
only fault in one router is considered, and occurrence of fault
on both routers connected to a PE is not investigated.
Some other works have tried to tackle faults in routers or
links via fault-tolerant routing algorithms, for instance [12],
[13] for 2D Mesh based NoCs and [14], [15], [16] for 3D NoCs
derived from the 3D Mesh with limited number of vertical
links in each layer. Bishnoi et al. have proposed a mechanism
for implementing routing algorithms in a fault-tolerant manner
for 2D Mesh NoCs and networks with topologies derived from
the 2D Mesh due to faults in the network [12]. The proposed
approach does not require routing tables at each router and the
routing logic is constant as the network scales up. Moreover,
it does not depend on the switching mechanism used in the
router, thus it supports both wormhole and virtual cut-through
switching mechanisms. One limitation of this work is that for
analysis of the proposed mechanism, only one and two faulty
link scenarios are considered.
In most of the works dealing with architecture-level ap-
proaches, there is usually a trade-off between the area overhead
and the robustness of the approach in order to cover more
faults. Some approaches rely on using Virtual Channels (VCs)
in order to avoid the formation of deadlock, such as [17], [18],
[16], whereas some others intend to save area consumption by
avoiding the use of VCs (e.g. [19]) , however, they instead
restrict the routing turns and/or consider some simplifying
assumptions regarding occurrence of faults (such as single
faults) or existence of specific links (known as pillar) in case
of 3D NoCs.
Reconfigurability is also one of the trends in order to
tolerate faults at router or link level, such as the work in [20].
Despite the advantages, architecture-level methods impose
additional area overhead and some of them are limited to
specific fault models and are not generic, i.e. they do not
address faults simultaneously on links, cores (PEs) and routing
turns.
B. System-level and Application-level approaches
On the other hand, system-level and application-level ap-
proaches exist for handling faults. Such approaches mostly put
the burden on software and try to provide flexibility while
not letting the system performance degrade significantly when
tolerating faults. System-level approaches also have different
levels of granularity when addressing faults, either considering
faults on PEs, routing turns and/or communication links. Some
of them focus on providing fault-resiliency via re-mapping
and/or re-scheduling tasks onto the network, such as [21].
Most works have tried to perform the re-mapping offline,
thus not imposing run-time latency overhead. Some works
also use redundancy techniques, but at the software level in
order to tackle faults. In total, system-level and application-
level approaches are more efficient compared to architecture-
level ones in terms of area overhead and run-time performance
degradation. In the following, some of worked regarding
system-level and application-level approaches are reviewed.
In [22], authors have introduced SHiFA, which is a system-
level approach for tolerating faults at run-time without im-
posing hardware overhead. The work addresses faults on
links, Processing Elements (PEs) and routers. The proposed
approach guarantees that mapping of applications is performed
on healthy nodes. The design of SHiFA is based on distributed
operating systems, thus being scalable for large networks.
SHiFA uses a hierarchical kernel structure which based on
the kernel’s duty, it can be either a Mobile Master (MM)
(keeps a view of the system and administers the Application
Managers), Application Manager (AM) (capabale of mapping
tasks onto nodes with basic kernel), or basic kernel. Despite
the distributed characteristic and scalability advantages SHiFA
possesses, if the Mobile Master fails (MM) further care should
be taken in order to delegate the task to another node, however,
this is left as future work.
Authors of [21] have proposed a system-level Fault-Aware
Resource Management (FARM) approach, which tends to
tackle permanent, transient and intermittent faults via fault-
aware mapping algorithm. The ultimate goal of the mapping
scheme is to optimize system performance and energy con-
sumption. One of the limitations of this work is that its focus
is mainly on occurrence of faults on Processing Elements
(PEs). To this end, spare cores (PEs) are utilized in order to
delegate the duty of the failed cores to them when re-mapping.
Thus, the problem of mapping is translated into the problem
of spare cores placements (as they might not be needed at
every router in the NoC) and assignment of tasks to them.
One disadvantage of this work could be that leveraging spare
cores imposes additional area overhead to the system, while
the faults could have been handled mostly at application or
system-level without additional significant hardware required.
In [23], a fault-tolerant approach for application-specific
NoCs is introduced. The methodology works based on con-
structing a decision tree for the different paths in the network,
which is used to determine alternative paths in case one
becomes faulty. The goal is to both improve reliability and
traffic distribution in the network. To this end, the approach
is described using problem formulation, while describing the
network using graph theory, and it is also claimed that the
approach can be integrated with any topology and any rout-
ing algorithm. Although the usage of routing tables allows
implementation of any routing algorithm in the network, it
suffers from scalability issues. As stated in the paper, the
proposed method covers faults only on communication links,
but no information is provided regarding addressing faults on
Processing Elements (cores) and routing turns.
Manolache et al. have proposed a heuristic-based approach
[24], which is based on message redundancy in order to
address faults on communication links and also aim to mini-
mize communication energy while meeting the stringent time-
constrained characteristics of applications. The proposed ap-
proach tries to provide a guaranteed message arrival probability
and guaranteed worst case response time. Despite the advan-
tages, the proposed approach imposes information overhead
as multiple copies of messages need to be created in order to
tolerate faulty network links (achieved via temporal and spatial
redundancy). Moreover, faults on routing turns and Processing
Elements (PEs) are not addressed in this work.
The work in [25] has presented the addition of a Fault
Prediction Module (FPM) to the Phoenix NoC architecture,
which makes it possible to predict the occurrence of faults
based on their tendency and it is controlled by a threshold
value. The focus is on fault prediction on network links, which
can be either operating properly, operating with fault tendency
or with permanent fault. It is shown that the area and power
overhead of the proposed module is acceptable compared to the
other compared works. It is worth noting that the detection of
faults is performed by a fault monitor unit and the classification
of the fault tendency is done via the software part located in the
Processing Element (PE), named OSPheonix. One limitation
of this work would be that for the experiments, only single and
double fault scenarios are considered and thus more number of
faults and also faults on Processing Elements (PEs) and routing
turns are not addressed. In addition, considering three counters
per each input port of each router in the network (except the
local port) imposes additional area overhead to the system.
The proposed approach in our work incorporates both
system- and application-level and architecture-level approaches
in order to provide a hybrid solution, thus making it possible
to perform run-time fault-aware management of NoC-based
many-core systems.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this paper, we propose an architecture for a fault-tolerant
many-core Network-on-Chip based system. The important
components of the architecture are shown in Fig. 1. In this
section we describe these components briefly.
Fig. 1: Proposed approach for adding fault tolerance mecha-
nisms
A. Target Architecture
The target architecture is a many-core NoC based system
that has one Router and one Processing Element (PE) in each
NoC tile. This can be either a 2D or a 3D NoC topology. Our
assumption is that the architecture is prone to faults and would
be either heterogeneous1 from the beginning by design or due
to manufacturing defects. During its lifetime, the architecture
will be affected by wear out and permanent faults.
B. System Health Monitoring Unit (SHMU)
SHMU is responsible for tracking diagnosis information in
the system, classification and abstraction of this information,
evaluation of the impact of the faults and updating System
Health Map (SHM). The fault information collected from the
system by using a fault detection mechanism provides SHMU
with a holistic view of system components’ health status. In
order to handle faults, SHMU interacts with other modules in
the system as well which are described as follows.
C. System Health Map (SHM)
System Health Map (SHM) is a shared memory between
SHMU and Mapper-Scheduler Unit (MSU), which keeps the
fault information about each component. This fault information
is very abstract and includes all the turns in the router, nodes’
health status (faulty or non-faulty) and nodes’ speed degrada-
tion due to aging. This means that for each network tile i, SHM
1By the term heterogeneous throughout this paper we mean the situation
in which faults degrade the network and disable links, Processing Elements,
turns in routers or affect some components of the network.
Fig. 2: Architecture of Mapper/Scheduler Unit
keeps the PEi health value along with the abstract health of
the router’s control part by assigning a health value to turns
Ti,k, where k denotes different 90 degree turns in the same
router. On top of these, each physical link between routers has
a health value Lj assigned to it in the System Health Map
memory. These values are binary and only show if a unit is
faulty or non-faulty. Finer granularity of health representation
can be taken into account, but it adds significantly to the size
of the SHM. SHM also keeps PE’s frequency decrement due
to aging in a byte. The size of SHM would be dependent on
the size and topology of the target architecture.
SHMU writes into SHM and can read from it, however,
the MSU can just read the contents of SHM. System Health
Map can be manipulated by SHMU in order to generate some
specific mapping based on predictions made. Fig. 3a shows
visualization of an example of SHM for a 2 × 2 2D Mesh
network with XY routing algorithm. Each router has eight
turns that are either red (restricted) or black (allowed) turns.
The edges between two routers are representing the physical
links and the small circle at the southern east of each router,
represents the Processing Element (PE) in that tile.
D. Mapper-Scheduler Unit (MSU)
The Mapper-Schedule Unit (MSU) is in charge of mapping
and scheduling the application onto the target architecture. A
more detailed diagram of MSU is shown in Fig. 2. This unit
maintains the following information:
Application Model: applications are represented in form of
Task Graphs. A Task Graph is denoted as an acyclic directed
graph TG(V,E), in which V represents a set of all tasks
Ti, i ∈ [0,m] (where m shows the number of tasks in
application), and E denotes the set of all edges between the
tasks which describes the interdependence of the tasks. There
is a weight associated with every graph edge that shows the
communication weight between two tasks. Later on, in case of
having a big search space for mapping algorithms, if m (the
number of tasks) is large, TG is clustered by the MSU into
a Clustered Task Graph, CTG(V,E), which is a directed graph
where V is a set of clusters in which each cluster contains a
set of tasks, and E is the set of edges between two clusters,
which encapsulates the communications between tasks in those
clusters, using different local-search heuristics.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: a) Visualization of System Health Map of a 2× 2 2D
Mesh network with XY routing, b) Example of Routing Graph
for the same network.
Architecture Model: The NoC topology is described in form
of a directed graph, called Architecture Graph (AG) in which
each node represents a tile, consisting of a router and Process-
ing Element (PE), and each edge denotes the communication
link between two tiles.
Routing Model: Routing is described in form of a Routing
Graph (RG) which is an acyclic directed graph, modeling
internal and external connections of the routers. The concept
of Routing Graph is adopted from [26]. Fig. 3b shows visual-
ization of an example of such routing graph for a 2x2 Mesh
network. Each router consists of five input nodes (four from
adjacent routers and one from local) and five output nodes
(four to adjacent routers and one towards local). By adding
an edge inside the router, a turn or direct connection can be
defined for routing algorithm. Adding an edge between two
adjacent routers shows a physical link connection between the
two. For 3D networks RG becomes slightly more complicated,
because instead of ten nodes per router, it requires fourteen
nodes per router (two additional nodes for up and two for down
direction are required). RG by being acyclic guarantees the
absence of deadlocks in the routing algorithm. Using Routing
Graph concept enables us to use standard graph algorithms to
find routes in the network under any turn model based routing
algorithm. A path from a source to destination starts at local
input port of the source node and ends at the local output
port of the destination node. In case of deterministic routing
algorithms such as XY routing, only one path exists in RG
from each source to each destination and the packets would
be scheduled on the physical links along this route. However,
for adaptive routing, it is possible that different routes are
returned by RG from each source to destination, in this case
scheduling of the packets would be performed probabilistically.
The Routing Graph is in sync with SHM, i.e. if a connection
fails in the system and is updated in SHM as broken, the same
connection is removed from RG.
E. Mapper Memories
Most Probable Mapping (MPM) memory is used by
Mapper-Scheduler Unit (MSU) to keep some mapping configu-
rations for future use to improve the system’s response to faults
(please refer to section V for more details). Current Mapping
Memory (CMM) is a shared memory between the MSU
and SHMU in order to pass the current mapping/scheduling
configuration from MSU to SHMU. Information in CMM
would be used for determining the impact of the faults on
system performance and choosing the proper action after fault
occurrence.
In the following sections, the above-mentioned components
are described in detail.
IV. TARGET ARCHITECTURE
The assumed target architecture is a many-core system
in which the Processing Elements (PE) communicate using a
Network-on-Chip (NoC). This NoC can be a 2D or 3D Mesh
or a subset of these topologies (This occurs due to defects in
the chip or permanent faults in the links between the routers).
We describe the fault-prone architecture with an Architecture
Graph Arch : AG(PE(F ), C(F )) where PE(F ) is a set of
{pei(F ),∀i ∈ [0, N ]} and pei(F ) is describing the ith Pro-
cessing Element under fault configuration F. And C(F ) is the
set of {cj(F ),∀j ∈ [0,K]} where each cj(F ) is representing
the jth communication link under fault configuration F.
In this work we assume that the target architecture supports
the following features:
A. Routing re-configuration
One of the proposals which addresses the implementa-
tion and re-configuration of routing algorithms in Network-
on-Chips is Logic-Based Distributed Routing (LBDR) [27].
LBDR is a mechanism which is able to implement routing
algorithms in 2D NoCs using only logical circuits, thus re-
moving the need for routing tables at each router. This, in
turn, leads to better scalability of the mechanism compared to
table-based routing approaches. LBDR performs the routing
decision based on two sets of configuration bits, known as
connectivity and routing bits. The former describes the network
topology in form of four bits per router, each one showing con-
nectivity to one of the cardinal directions (North, East, Weat
or South), whereas the latter describes the routing algorithm
in form of allowed and restricted turns. Routing restrictions
are considered as 90-degree turns, thus, 8 bits are considered
at each router for the routing bits. It is worth noting that
the values of the configuration bits are set offline before the
normal operation of the network, therefore, not imposing any
additional latency overhead during run-time. This is performed
using the framework explained in [28].
One main advantage of LBDR over routing tables is that
as the size of the network grows, the complexity of the routing
logic at each router remains the same, thus being a scalable
mechanism. In addition, the values of connectivity and routing
bits can be used in order to update information in System
Health Map (SHM) memory in SHMU. At each router, if an
output port (connected to other routers) is faulty or not active,
the corresponding connectivity bit is set to zero. Moreover, if
there is a turn restriction at each router or the corresponding
turn is faulty in a router, this can be set by modifying the
values of the routing bits. It is worth noting that the values of
the configuration bits in LBDR only need to be updated once
the network has started operating for the first time and also
whenever a fault occurs on an output port or in a turn in the
router. As mentioned earlier, the (re-)configuration process and
(re-)computation of the new values for the bits are performed
offline and fed into the logic.
B. Online fault detection mechanism
In order to be able to capture the occurrence of faults during
run-time in routers, each router is equipped with an online fault
detection circuity (known as concurrent online checkers [29],
[2]) embedded in it, which basically performs verification of
different properties that should hold for different components
of the router. It is worth noting that the checkers proposed and
used in this work are able to detect both data-path and control
part faults in the NoC routers. To be more specific, single
Stuck-at-0 (SA0) and Stuck-at-1 (SA1) faults are handled by
the checkers.
Regarding the control part, checkers exist which can cover
the faults occurred: (1) in the routing computation unit (in our
case, the routing logic is implemented using LBDR mecha-
nism), (2) in the arbitration unit and (3) in the control part
of input buffers (which are implemented as First-In-First-Out
(FIFO)). For the data-path, a single odd parity bit is utilized,
providing the detection of single stuck-at faults.
To propagate the fault information to SHMU, iJTAG [1]
mechanism is used. This would enable online and modular
access to checkers. Some tiles of the network are equipped
with gateways for passing diagnosis information to the System
Health Monitoring Unit. This mechanism enables SHMU to
run some test programs on each PE and collect the test data
through the NoC infrastructure through these gateways. These
gateways are implemented as memory mapped devices sharing
a bus with PE of the tile and do not impose much area overhead
on the system.
C. NoCDepend
In this work we assume that the target architecture supports
NoCDepend mechanism proposed in [3] for reach-ability cal-
culation. This method stores information about non-reachable
parts of the network into a limited number of registers in
each router output, represented in form of a rectangular shape
and are defined using two corners of the rectangle. These
areas are calculated using Routing Graph (RG) by finding a
path between every source and destination and merged and
optimized further more. The number of dedicated registers
is decided by the user and can vary based on the system’s
area constraints. Before assigning an output to a packet, the
router checks whether the destination is reachable via that
output or not. In case the destination is not reachable from
any of router’s ports, the router should immediately drop the
packet in order to prevent injection of non-reachable packets
into the system which can cause network congestion. The
calculated non-reachable areas would be later on transferred to
the registers in the routers using iJTAG [1]. This calculation
is indeed computationally expensive, but this process is only
needed every time a permanent fault occurs.
The same mechanism can be used for network partitioning
[30] for complete traffic separation of Critical from Non-
Critical regions in the chip. This along with reconfigurable
routing enables using deterministic routing algorithms for
critical regions and adaptive routing algorithm for non-critical
regions, which improves the network latency compared to
the case of using the same routing algorithm for the whole
network.
V. SYSTEM HEALTH MONITORING UNIT (SHMU)
In order to make the management of faults possible, the
whole system is facilitated with a System Health Monitoring
Unit (SHMU), which collects the fault diagnosis reports from
the checkers from all routers and based on this information,
it maintains a general view of the health status of different
network components. Based on the information collected from
the checkers and online testing, SHMU is able to update the
health status information of the network nodes, turns and links
in SHM. The status of a network component can be either set
to Healthy or Broken in SHM. Also, SHMU records aging
of the processing elements and updates the corresponding
information in SHM as the components go through aging.
One of the main roles of SHMU is to classify faults into
Transient, Intermittent and Permanent classes. For intermittent
faults, SHMU should predict a time interval until the fault
becomes permanent. SHMU should assign a severity metric to
the received fault diagnosis information and take appropriate
action in order to mitigate the effects. This means that SHMU
can either ignore the fault (in case of no severe effect on
the system), or can issue an order to Mapper-Scheduler Unit
(MSU) to prepare another mapping. This mapping either
should be used immediately or in case of prediction of oc-
currence in short future should be stored in Most Probable
Mapping memory.
We define Most Probable Faults Set (MPFS) as a
set of fi most probable faults that can occur to each
AG(PE(F ), C(F )) based on diagnosis information re-
ceived from the architecture under a certain mapping
M(App,Arch(F )). These most probable faults would be
stored in the SHMU database. We can define a set of next
most probable mappings as:
MPM : {M(App,Arch(F + fi))|∀fi ∈MPFS}
To calculate these mappings, SHMU updates the System
Health Map with a certain fault (which is predicted to happen),
then issues a map and store order to the Mapping-Scheduling
unit. Upon receiving this, the MSU will calculate the mapping
and store it with a fault tag (which encapsulates the fault
configuration) in MPM memory. Afterwards, SHMU would
return the SHM to its original state. In terms of the level
of granularity, the proposed SHMU in this work is able to
deal with faults occurred on Processing Elements (PEs) (node
faults), routing turns (turn faults) and communication links
(link faults).
The placement of SHMU in the system is also important,
as it can be either one of the nodes in the network, or it can
be a separate unit, embedded in the system, but not as part of
the NoC. It should be noted that we have opted for the latter
implementation since it makes it easier to for SHMU and MSU
to communicate through a dual port shared memory (System
Health Map).
VI. MAPPER-SCHEDULER UNIT (MSU)
The Mapper-Scheduler Unit (see Fig. 2) is in charge of
finding mapping/scheduling solutions for each fault configura-
tion. To perform this task, MSU needs to keep Task Graph
(TG) which is essentially the application that encapsulates
information about release time, Worst Case Execution Time
(WCET) and criticality level of the tasks, and their depen-
dencies, Architecture Graph (AG) which keeps information
regarding network topology and portioning, Clustered Task
Graph (CTG) which would be used to reduce search space of
the mapping problem for large applications and the Routing
Graph (RG) which describes how packets can flow through
the network. Based on these models, MSU runs mapping and
scheduling heuristics (either greedy local search or iterative
local search with different cost functions to optimize either the
scheduling length, reduce/balance the network traffic, balance
processor utilization, etc.-the choice of algorithm and cost
function is made by user) and maps TG (or CTG in case
of clustering) onto AG. The main target of these heuristics
is finding a feasible solution with acceptable quality, in few
steps. The quality of these heuristics are benchmarked against
simulated annealing. However, these heuristics are out of the
scope of this paper and would be addressed separately.
The mapping generated by MSU should be in compliance
with constraints of RG. We can formulate this process as:
M(App,Arch) : TG(V,E)→ AG(P (F ), C(F ))
It does not matter to directly map TG on AG or perform
mapping on CTG, in the end a PE would be assigned for each
task on TG for execution, that is the main reason that we do
not change our representation for mapping for different cases.
Upon receiving a ”Map and Store” order from SHMU,
MSU starts calculating the mapping by choosing proper heuris-
tic according to information recieved from SHMU. For each
mapping, we define a list which ith element of it represents
the processing element id chosen for mapping for the ith task.
Constructing such a list will provide us with an estimate of the
memory usage in the mapper/scheduler. Each mapping also
has a fault tag that describes the fault configuration associated
with it. This will result in the following data-structure for each
mapping in MPM:
Fault Tag pt0 pt1 ... ptm
Different approaches can be taken for Fault Tag generation.
The easiest is to hash the SHM into a fixed size string.
The size of this memory depends on the application size and
system requirements. Bigger number of mappings to be stored,
require more number of entries in MPM which results in bigger
memory size.
Upon receiving a ”Map and Deploy” order from SHMU,
MSU first checks the fault configuration with the pre-
calculated mappings tags in MPM. In case of having a hit
in MPM, MSU goes further and extracts the difference with
the current mapping in order to perform a partial mapping and
then deploys the mapping on PEs. In case of not finding the
fault tag in MPM, MSU starts calculating the mapping for the
current fault configuration, performs partial mapping extraction
and deploys it on PEs.
We define reconfiguration latency TRL as the time needed
for mapper/scheduler to reconfigure the architecture and map
the application after a remap order is received. In cases that
the occurred fault is not in MPFS, the reconfiguration latency
would be:
TRL = TMapAlg + TParExt + TParMap
Where TMapAlg is the time needed for computation of
a new mapping and scheduling algorithm. TParExt is the
time needed for extracting partial mapping and TParMap
describes the time required for applying partial mapping on
the architecture. If there is a hit in MPM, the reconfiguration
latency TRL would be:
TRL = Tfetch + TSchd + TParExt + TParMap
Where Tfetch refers to time required to fetch the map-
ping from the memory and TSchd is needed for calculating
scheduling times. TSchd is needed because we are not storing
scheduling times for the tasks to save memory. By using ASAP
scheduling algorithm the system would regenerate the same
scheduling from the mapping which is of the complexity of
O(n). This would enable the system to recover from a failure
TMapAlg − (Tfetch + TSchd) time units faster. It is important
to note that in case of performing mapping, the system has
to run the scheduling algorithm once in each mapping step
in order to calculate the cost of mapping since scheduling
length is an important factor in the mapping cost function. This
would make the gap between these two terms rather significant.
Even though these mapping heuristics are fast, they need tens
(sometimes hundreds) of steps to find a suitable solution.
Another important note is that this improvement is for the
best case scenarios, In the cases of MPM miss, the same long
mapping scheduling calculation process is needed. Therefore,
the performance of this approach is heavily dependant on how
well the system can predict the Most Probable Faults. This
part is at the moment under development.
VII. EXPERIMENTATION SETUP
In order analyze the dependability mechanisms in a NoC
based many core system and perform the experiments, we
have developed an open-source tool, written in Python, named
”Schedule and Depend” [31] in which the whole target ar-
chitecture and the proposed components for providing fault-
tolerance are implemented in software, along with the possi-
bility of simulating different application scenarios. The tool
supports different 2D and 3D topologies and network parti-
tioning based on NoCDepend method, along with the support
for different heuristic-based methods (with different cost func-
tions) for clustering and mapping/scheduling of application
tasks onto the NoC-based system. In addition, different de-
terministic and adaptive, turn model based routing algorithms
are supported by the tool. The tool provides the user with
different possibilities for choosing the application running on
the target architecture (from randomly generated Task Graphs
to user defined application and some available benchmarks)
and has support for mixed-critical applications in which some
tasks have higher criticality and must be scheduled within a
specified time interval. Finally, the tool is equipped with a
Graphical User Interface (GUI) which makes it possible for the
user to easily set different parameters, along with visualization
of different results obtained from clustering tasks, scheduling,
mapping and process of optimization for mapping and clus-
tering heuristics. The project is maintained under GNU-GPL2
license in github, along with all the documentation, available
in project wiki.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed a fault-tolerant approach for
Network-on-Chip based many-more systems which incorpo-
rates a System Health Monitoring Unit that keeps a holistic
view of the system health by collecting fault information via
online fault detection mechanisms using iJTAG chains. The
fault information is classified into different classes (transient,
intermittent and permanent), the Mapping/Scheduling Unit is
utilized in order to find feasible mapping scheduling solutions
for system recovery. A mapping storage system based on
prediction of future faults is proposed to reduce the recon-
figuration time after each system failure. Currently, all the
proposed components are developed in our system except fault
classification/prediction which is currently under development.
By completion of this unit, the system loop would be closed
and some comparisons could be made with the state of the art.
An experimentation environment is developed for simulation of
the proposed approach and a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA) based emulator is also under development in order to
test the proposed methods and approaches on hardware. This
would confirm if the scheduling and simulation results would
comply with the actual implementation of the system when
different applications are running on the system.
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